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Abstract
If the value cumulative distribution functions are log-concave at the high-
est lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes
the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction in the asymmetric
independent private values model.
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation Number: D44
1Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions
1. Introduction
The analysis of the ﬁrst-price auction becomes quite complex as soon as one
departs from the, often unrealistic, assumption that the bidders’ valuations are
distributed identically. Ties may have to be broken according to a rule diﬀerent
from the fair tie-breaking rule in order for an equilibrium to exist (see Lebrun
1996, 2002, Jackson et al. 2002, Maskin and Riley 2000b). Moreover, when
an equilibrium exists, it may not be possible to obtain a explicit mathematical
formula for it. Nevertheless, under some regularity assumptions on the valu-
ation distributions, there exists an implicit characterization of the equilibrium
(see Lebrun 1999a and Maskin and Riley 2000a).
In order to gain some insights into the properties of the equilibrium, some
authors have tried to overcome the lack of a general formula by computing
numerical estimates of the equilibria (see Athey 2001, Bajari 2001, Dalkir et
al. 2000, Li and Riley 1997, Marshall et al. 1994, , Maskin and Riley 2000a,
Marshall and Shulenberg 2000). The uniqueness of the equilibrium would save
these authors the trouble of looking for other equilibria, once they have found
one. The uniqueness would also be useful to experimental researchers. Indeed,
they would have to compare their subjects’ bidding behaviors with only one
equilibrium.
Lebrun (2002) proves that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper-
hemicontinuous with respect to the valuation distributions. Assumptions under
which the equilibrium is unique would thus imply the continuity of this corre-
spondence. In turn, this continuity would bring robustness to the numerical
simulations. Properties of the equilibrium would not be particular to the pre-
cise examples the researchers have solved numerically, but would be robust to
small changes in the valuation distributions. Similarly, the uniqueness of the
equilibrium would bring robustness to some theoretical results, which would
hold true for larger classes of valuation distributions than those for which they
were proved2.
Maskin and Riley (1996) and Bajari (2001) consider the uniqueness issue
when the valuation distributions are absolutely continuous with density func-
tions continuous and strictly positive everywhere over the supports3.E v e n i n
natural examples where the valuations are distributed over the same interval,
density functions may vanish at its lower extremity. Assume that m>1 bid-
ders whose valuations are distributed identically according to the cumulative
distribution function F collude into one cartel. Assume further that, inside
the cartel, the information about the members’ valuations and the monitoring
of the members’ bids are perfect and that all allocations and side-payments are
possible. Then, the cartel will maximize the total surplus of its members and,
when it wins the item, will allocate it to its member with the highest valua-
tion. The cartel will, thus, behave as a single bidder with valuation cumulative
2distribution function Fm. The density function of Fm vanishes at the lower
extremity of the support, even if the density function of F does not4.T h e r e
has been great interest in the literature for this case (see Marshall et al. 1994,
Thomas 1997, Dalkir et al. 2000, Whaerer 1999). Considering the likely preva-
lence of collusion in auctions (see, for example, Graham and Marshall 1985,
Hendricks and Porter 1989, Baldwin et al. 1997, Persendorfer 2000, Porter and
Zona 1999), this interest is well deserved.
Lebrun (1999) proves uniqueness in the common-support case when the val-
uation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support.
If the reserve price is binding, this result implies uniqueness even when the
valuation distributions are atomless. However, it does not apply to atomless
distributions when the reserve price is not binding. Lebrun (1999a) also proves
uniqueness in the symmetric case, when all valuation distributions are identical,
and in the case where the set of valuation distributions reduces to a pair of
stochastically ranked distributions5.
Here, we prove uniqueness without requiring mass points, nor the existence
of strictly positive continuous extensions of the density functions. Furthermore,
we do not require any relation of stochastic dominance, in particular, any equal-
ity, between valuation distributions. Rather, as is common in economic theory
(see Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989 and An 1998), we impose a condition of log-
concavity on the valuation cumulative distribution functions. Although many
standard parametric distributions are strictly log-concave over their whole sup-
ports, we require only local strict log-concavity at the highest lower extremity
of the supports. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption of decreas-
ing reverse hazard rates in some, arbitrarily small, interval to the right of this
highest lower extremity.
Our proof consists manly in a simple geometric argument. In Section 2,
we ﬁrst consider the common-support case, where this argument is most easily
explained. In Section 3, we extend our result from the common-support case to
t h ec a s eo fp o s s i b l yd i ﬀerent lower extremities and identical upper extremities
by truncating the valuation distributions from below. We next extend, in
Section 4, our result to the case where even the upper extremities may diﬀer by
considering the equilibrium strategies as restrictions over the valuation supports
of the best reply functions. These best reply functions are deﬁned over larger
intervals and we apply to these best reply functions the arguments we previously
applied to the equilibrium strategies in the common-support case. Section 5
concludes. Details of our proofs can be found in Appendices 1 to 6.
2. Statement of the Main Result
Consider the standard independent private values model with n risk-neutral
bidders, a reserve price r, the fair tie-breaking rule, and possibly diﬀerent val-
uation probability distributions F1, ..., Fn, with, possibly diﬀerent, interval
supports [ci,d i],w i t hci <d i. We use the same notation for a probability dis-
tribution and its cumulative distribution function that is continuous from the
3right. We now describe our basic set of regularity assumptions on the valuation
distributions.
Assumptions A.1:
(A.1) For all i =1 ,...,n, the support of Fi is an interval [ci,d i],w i t h
ci <d i.
(A.2) For all i =1 ,...,n, the cumulative function Fi is diﬀerentiable
over (ci,d i] with a derivative fi locally bounded away from zero over this inter-
val6.
Under Assumptions A.1, the valuation interval [ci,d i] may diﬀer accross
bidders and there may not exist any strictly positive and continuous extension
of fi over the whole interval [ci,d i]. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that the support of F1 has the largest lower extremity and the support of F2
has the second largest, that is, ci ≤ c2 ≤ c1, for all i ≥ 2. Although we will
allow ci to be a mass point of Fi in some of our intermediate results, we will
mainly focus on the atomless case, which is more natural in many applications7.
Theorem 1 below is our main result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume also Fi (ci)=0 ,
for all i ≥ 1. Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci,f o ra l li ≥ 2.
Then, under any of the following additional assumptions (i), (ii), or (iii), the
ﬁrst-price auction with reserve price r has one and only one Bayesian Nash
equilibrium where bidders bid at most their valuations:
(i) r>c 1
(ii) c1 >c 2
(iii) there exists δ>0 such that Fi is strictly log-concave over (c1,c 1 + δ)∩
(ci,d i),f o ra l li ≥ 1.
The cumulative function Fi is strictly log-concave over (c1,c 1 + δ)∩(ci,d i) if
and only if lnFi is strictly concave, that is, its derivative
fi
Fi—the reverse hazard
rate—is strictly decreasing over this interval. In the next section, we prove
Theorem 1 in the case of a common support. We then extend our proof to the
general case in the following sections.
3. Relevant Existing Results
Assume that the valuation supports are identical, that is, that ci = c and
di = d, for all i. In this section, we allow the valuation distributions to have a
mass point at c. Since the case where the bidders’ valuations are larger than
the reserve price with probability zero is uninteresting, we assume that r<d .
When the reserve price is nonbinding, that is, r ≤ c, the proof in Lebrun (1999a
or 1997) of the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in a model where
c may be a mass point of some valuation distributions, extends easily to our
4model. Lebrun (1999a) also provides a characterization of the equilibria and
proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium when c is a mass point of all valuation
distributions. We have the results R.1 and R.2 below, which, along with their
extensions and the methodology of their proofs, we will use in proving Theorem
1( S e c t i o n2 ) .
Existing Results I (Lebrun 1999a): Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed.
Assume further ci = c, di = d, for all i,a n dr ≤ c.
C.1: Characterization of the Equilibria
There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In every equilibrium the bidders
follow nondecreasing bid functions β1,...,βn that are not smaller than c over
(c,d] and that are strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable when their values are
strictly larger than c. Moreover, for every equilibrium (β1,...,βn) there exists
η in (c,d) such that the inverse bid functions α1 = β
−1
1 ,...,αn = β
−1
n are
solutions of the system of diﬀerential equations (1)—considered over the domain






















for all i =1 ,...,n and b in (c,d],
αi (c)=c, for all, except possibly one, i between 1 and n,( 2 )
α1 (η)=...αn (η)=d (3).
U.1: Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
If F1 (c),...,Fn (c) > 0, there exists one and only one equilibrium.
In the second initial condition (3) in R.1 above, η is the common maximum






lnFi (αi (b)) =
1
αj (b) − b
.(4)
In order to prove (1), Lebrun (1999a) actually obtained (4) ﬁrst. Once the
regularity conditions have been proved, (4) is the ﬁrst-order condition from
bidder j’s maximization problem. In fact, the maximum of the expected payoﬀ
(vj − b)
Q
i6=j Fj (αj (b)) of bidder j with valuation vj must be reached at b =




i6=j lnFi (αi (b)) of the expected
5payoﬀ must thus vanish at b = βj (vj) or, equivalently, at vj = αj (b),a n d( 4 )
follows.
From (2), if there exists j such that αj (c) >c ,t h e nαi (c)=c, for all i 6= j.
From (4), if αj (c) >c ,t h e n d
db lnFi (αi (b)) is bounded when b tends towards c,
and, thus, lnFi (αi (c)) = lnFi (c) cannot be inﬁnite, that is, Fi (c) > 0, for all
i 6= j. The only time a bidder’s inverse bid function takes at c av a l u es t r i c t l y
larger than c or, equivalently, the only time a bidder’s bid function can take the
value c everywhere over a nondegenerate interval is when all the other bidders’
valuation distributions have a mass point at c. We have proved Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume further ci = c,
di = d, for all i,a n dr ≤ c.L e t (α1,...,αn) be a solution over (c,η],w i t h
c<η , of (2) and (1)—considered in D—and let j be in {1,..,n}.I f αj (c) >c ,
then Fi (c) > 0,f o ra l li 6= j.
When we consider, as in Lebrun (1999a), the unknown functions of the
equations (1) to be ψ1 = F1α1,...,ψn = Fnαn, the R.H.S.’s of these equations
are not locally Lipschitz at b = c since, at this point, denominators vanish and
αi = F
−1
i (ψi (b)) may not be locally Lipschitz, if fi vanishes or is not deﬁned.
Even if the ﬁrst initial condition (2) was completely determined, we could, thus,
not infer the uniqueness of the solution of (1), (2), and (3) from the theory of
ordinary diﬀerential equations.
Lebrun (1999a) chooses rather to consider the solutions of the system the
diﬀerential equations (1) form and of the second initial condition (3), which
satisﬁes the assumptions of the standard theorems (again, for the unknown
functions ψ1 = F1α1,...,ψn = Fnαn). However, in this initial condition, η is an
unknown parameter. Lebrun (1999a) proves the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to (1), (2), and (3) by proving the existence and uniqueness of a value
of the parameter η such that the solution of (1) and (3) also satisﬁes (2). In his
proof, Lebrun (1999a) establishes and uses the following important property of
strict monotonicity over (c,d] of the solutions of (1) and (3) with respect to η.
Lemma 2: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume further ci = c,
di = d,f o ra l li,a n dr ≤ c.L e t η and e η be in (c,d) such that η<e η.L e t
(α1,...,αn) be the solution over (γ,η],w i t hγ<η , of (1) and (3) for the value
η of the parameter and let (e α1,..., e αn) be the solution over (e γ,e η],w i t he γ<e η,
of (1) and (3) for the value e η of the parameter. Then, e αi (b) <α i (b),f o ra l lb
in (max(γ,e γ),η] and all i =1 ,...,n.
For the sake of completeness and because we will use Lemma 2 several times
in this paper, we provide a proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix 1. In Section 4
and Appendix 5.2 (Lemma A5.2-2), we extend Lemma 2 to the case of diﬀerent
supports.
The uniqueness result U.1 actually follows easily from (4) and Lemma 2. In
fact, suppose that there exist two equilibria and thus two diﬀerent values η and e η
such that the respective solutions (α1,...,αn) and (e α1,..., e αn) o f( 1 )a n d( 3 )a r e
6also solutions of (2). Let j be an integer between 1 and n such that αi (c)=c,
for all i 6= j (from (2) such an integer exists). Without loss of generality, we
can assume that η<e η.T h e v a l u e 8of ln
Q
i6=j Fi (αi (b)) at b = η is thus
strictly larger than the value of ln
Q
i6=j Fi (e αi (b)) at the same point. From
Lemma 2, we have e αi (b) <α i (b), for all b in (c,η] and all i =1 ,...,n, and, by
taking the limit for b tending towards c, e αi (c)=c, for all i 6= j.F r o m ( 4 ) , t h e
derivative of ln
Q
i6=j Fi (αi (b)) is thus strictly smaller than the derivative of
ln
Q
i6=j Fi ( e αi (b)) over (c,η].C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e d i ﬀerence between these two
logarithms increases as b decreases towards c and they cannot both be equal to
the same ﬁnite value lnFi (c)
n−1 at b = c.
As is apparent from the previous paragraph and from Lemma 2, all that is
needed to ensure the uniqueness of the equilibrium is that, among F1,...,Fn,a t
least n − 1 valuation distributions have a mass point at c9. Observe also that
if the reserve price is binding, that is, if r>c , the equations characterizing the
equilibrium are unchanged if we modify the valuation distributions by concen-
trating at r the probabilities spread over [c,r].B y d o i n g s o , r becomes the lower
extremity of the common support and all valuation distributions have a mass
point at r. Result U.1 can then be applied and one and only one equilibrium
exists. We have C.2 and U.2 below.
From Lemma 1, the condition (2) in the characterization C.1 can be replaced
by the condition (2”) in C.3 below when at least two valuation distributions are
atomless and the reserve price is not binding, that is, r ≤ c.
Extension of Results I: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume
further ci = c and di = d, for all i.
C.2: Characterization of the Equilibria
C.1 holds true, even when r>c , if (2) is replaced by (2’) below:
αi (max(c,r)) = max(c,r), for all, except possibly one, ibetween 1and n.( 2 ’ )
C.3: Characterization with a Nonbinding Reserve Price and
At Least Two Atomless Distributions: Assume that r ≤ c and that there
exist at least two diﬀerent values of the index k such that Fk (c)=0 .
C.1 holds true even if (2) is replaced by (2”) below:
α1 (c)=... = αn (c)=c.(2”)
U.2: Uniqueness of the Equilibrium10
If Fi (c) > 0, for at least (n − 1) values in {1,...,n} of the index i,o ri f
r>c , then there exists one and only one equilibrium.
74. The Common-Support Case
4.1 The Symmetric Case
As in the previous section, we assume in this section that ci = c, di = d,
r<d , and we allow the valuation distributions to have a mass point at c.
Lebrun (1999a), in the general n bidder case, and Maskin and Riley (2000a), in
the two bidder case, prove the property P.1 below of the equilibrium, according
to which the same relations of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance pass through
from the valuation distributions to the bid distributions. From P.1, if two
distributions Fi and Fj are equal, bidders i and j use the same equilibrium bid
function, that is, βi = βj. Thus, in the symmetric case, where the bidders’
valuations are distributed identically, all bidders use the same bid function β.
By transforming any equation in (1) as an equation in the only unknown β
and solving this diﬀerential equation as in Riley and Samuelson (1981), Lebrun
(1999a) proves U.3 below—the uniqueness in the symmetric case.
Existing Results II (Lebrun 1999a): Let Assumptions A be satisﬁed.
Assume further ci = c and di = d, for all i.
P.1: Properties of the Equilibria
(i) If Fi ≤ Fj, then, for all Bayesian Nash equilibrium (β1,...,βn),w eh a v e
Fiαi ≤ Fjαj over [r,η],w h e r eη = β1 (d)=... = βn (d).
(ii) If Fi = Fj, then, for all Bayesian Nash equilibrium (β1,...,βn),w eh a v e
βi = βj.
U.3: Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in the Symmetric Case
If F1 = ... = Fn,t h ee q u i l i b r i u m(β1,...,βn) is unique and symmetric, that
is, β1 = ... = βn.
From U.3 above, the equilibrium is unique in the symmetric case where
Fi = F, for all i, even when, contrary to the assumptions of U.2, F is atomless
and r is nonbinding, that is, r ≤ c. Consequently, we do not need to consider
the symmetric case in our proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2). However, because
this case is particularly simple, we use it in this subsection to introduce and
illustrate our main argument of proof.
The symmetric case with an atomless valuation distribution F and a non-
binding reserve price satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 1 (Section 2) if and
only if there exists δ>0 such that F is strictly log-concave over an interval
(c,c + δ),w i t hδ>0.L e t (β1,...,βn) be an equilibrium for such a symmetric
case. From P.1 (ii), this equilibrium is symmetric and β1 = ... = βn = β.T h e
system of diﬀerential equations (1) in the characterization C.1 reduces to the












where η = β1 (d)=... = βn (d) belongs to (c,d).
Figure 1 depicts a solution of (5), (6), and (7) as well as the “direction ﬁeld”
deﬁned by the equation (5) in the space of couples (b,v). The graph of any





everyone of its points (b,v).S i n c e t h e d i ﬀerence between v and b is ﬁxed along
any line parallel to the 45 degree-line, the ratio 1
v−b is also ﬁxed along such a
line. From our assumption of strict log-concavity of F over (c,c + δ),t h er a t i o
F(v)
f(v) is increasing in v over this interval. Consequently, near (c,c),t h es l o p e
deﬁned by (5) at a point on a line parallel to the 45 degree-line is steeper the
further this point is to the right of c. If there existed two diﬀerent solutions
of (5) and (6), the points of their graphs on a line parallel to and above the 45
degree-line would spread further apart as this line gets closer to the 45 degree-
line. Thus, both their graphs could not get closer to the point (c,c) on the 45
degree-line as b tends towards c.
One way to make the argument at the end of the previous paragraph more
formal is to ﬁrst suppose that there exist two diﬀerent solutions of (5) and (6)
and thus two diﬀerent values η and e η of the parameter such that the corre-
sponding solutions α and e α of (5) and (7) are also solutions of (6). Assume
that e η is the strictly smaller value. As depicted in Figure 2, the graph of the
corresponding solution e α thus lies above the graph of the solution α. If we slide
the graph of the function α down along the 45 degree-line by a small ε>0,
we obtain the graph of the new function b α,s u c ht h a tb α(b)=α(b + ε) − ε and
such that b α(c − ε)=c−ε. The derivative d
dbb α(b) of this function at b is equal
to the derivative d









b α(b)−b.S i n c e F (v)/f (v)
is strictly increasing for v close to c, the derivative d




b α(b)−b, for all b close to c. Consequently, at any intersection point near
(c,c), the graph of the function b α must be strictly steeper than the graph of any
solution of (5) and, in particular, than the graph of e α. The graph of this latter
function e α could, thus, not cross from the right and from above the graph of
the former function b α in order to reach the point (c,c),a n de α could not be a
solution of (6). There cannot be two distinct solutions of (5), (6), and (7) and
the equilibrium is unique. In the next subsection, we apply this argument to
the general, possibly asymmetric, common-support case.
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114.2 The General Common-Support Case
Let the assumptions of Theorem 1 (Section 2) be satisﬁed. The valuation
distributions are, thus, atomless. From U.2 (Section 3), we can assume, in our
proof of Theorem 1 for the common-support case, that the reserve price is not
binding, that is, r ≤ c. The characterization C.3 (Section 3) then applies.
For the general asymmetric case, where the valuation distributions may be
diﬀerent, it is diﬃcult to depict the direction ﬁe l da sw eh a v ed o n ei nF i g u r e1
for the symmetric case. In fact, according to (1), the slope of any component
αi depends not only on this component and on b, but also on all the other
components αj, j 6= i. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to apply the “sliding”
argument of the previous subsection to the general asymmetric case. According
to Lemma 3 below, if we slide a solution of (1) down the 45 degree-line, we
obtain a solution, not of the system of diﬀerential equations (1), but rather
of the system of diﬀerential strict inequations (10). At any meeting point
between a solution of the system of diﬀerential equations (1) and a not larger
solution of the system (10) of diﬀerential inequations, the solution of the system
of diﬀerential inequations (10) is steeper. As we show in Lemma 4 below, no
solution of the system of the diﬀerential equations (1) can, thus, cross from the
right and from above a solution of the system of diﬀerential inequations (10).
The proof (by reductio ab absurdum), illustrated in Figure 2 for the symmetric
case, goes through to the asymmetric case.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume ci = c and di = d,
for all i. Assume also that there exists δ>0 such that F1,...,Fn are strictly log-
concave over (c,c + δ).L e t (α1,...,αn) be a solution of (1) with strictly positive
derivatives11 over an interval (c,c + γ] such that γ>0 and αi (c + γ) <c+ δ.
Let ε be a strictly positive number strictly smaller than γ,t h a ti s ,0 <ε<γ .
Let b α1,..., b αn be deﬁned as follows:
b αi (b)=αi (b + ε) − ε,(8)
for all b in (c − ε,c + γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
c<b αi (b) <c+ δ − ε,(9)
for all b in (c,c + γ − ε],a n d(b α1,..., b αn) is a solution over (c,c + γ − ε] of the




b αi (b) >
Fi (b αi (b))


















1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
12Lemma 4: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume ci = c and di = d,
for all i. Assume also that there exists δ>0 such that F1,...,Fn are strictly log-
concave over (c,c + δ).L e t (α1,...,αn), γ, ε,a n d(b α1,..., b αn) be as in Lemma
3. Let (e α1,..., e αn) be another solution of the system (1) over the interval (c,γ]
as in Lemma 3, that is, (e α1,..., e αn) is a solution of (1)—considered in the domain
D—over (c,γ] with strictly positive derivatives over this interval and such that
e αi (c + γ) <c+ δ, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If
b αi (c + γ − ε) < e αi (c + γ − ε),(11)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,t h e n
b αi (b) < e αi (b),(12)
for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2) in the Common-Support Case:A s
we explain above, we can assume that the assumptions of C.3 are satisﬁed and
we may replace (2) by (2”). Suppose that there exist two equilibria (β1,...,βn)
and
³
e β1,..., e βn
´
. The inverse bid functions (α1,...,αn) and (e α1,..., e αn) are
solutions, with strictly positive derivatives, of the diﬀerential system (1) with
boundary conditions (2”) and (3) for diﬀerent values η and e η of the parameter.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that e η<η .
From (2”), there exists 0 <γ<e η such that
e αi (c + γ) <c+ δ, (13)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. From Lemma 2 (Section 2), we know that αi (b) < e αi (b),f o r
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for all b in (c,e η], and thus that αi (c + γ) < e αi (c + γ), for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.S i n c e e αi (c + γ − ε) tends towards e αi (c + γ) when ε tends towards
zero, there exists 0 <ε<γsuch that
αi (c + γ) − ε<e αi (c + γ − ε),(14)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,d e ﬁne b αi as follows:
b αi (b)=αi (b + ε) − ε,
for all b in (c − ε,η − ε]. From (14), we have (15) below:
b αi (c + γ − ε) < e αi (c + γ − ε), (15)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
From (13), (14), (15), and Lemma 4, we have:
b αi (b) < e αi (b), (16)
13for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.M a k i n g b in (16) tend towards
c,w eﬁnd, from (2”), b αi (c)=αi (c + ε) − ε ≤ e α(c)=c, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
However, since (c + ε,α1 (c + ε),...,αn (c + ε)) belongs to the domain D of (1),
we have αi (c + ε) >c+ε and, thus, e αi (c)=αi (c + ε)−ε>c , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We obtain a contradiction and we have proved Theorem 1. ||
5. Extension to Possibly Diﬀerent Supports
5.1 Extension to Possibly Diﬀerent Lower Extremities
In this section, we extend our proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2) from the
common-support case (Section 4) to the general case, with possibly diﬀerent
supports. Consider ﬁrst the case where only the lower extremities of the sup-
ports may diﬀer. The upper extremities are identical and we still denote by
d the common upper extremity, that is, d1 = ... = dn = d. We can again
assume that the reserve price is strictly smaller than d,t h a ti s ,r<d .L e t
the assumptions of Theorem 1 (Section 2) be satisﬁed12. Thus, the valuation
distributions are atomless, the support of F1 has the largest lower extremity,
and the support of F2 has the second largest, that is, ci ≤ c2 ≤ c1, for all i ≥ 2.
T h ec a s ew h e r et h er e s e r v ep r i c er is not smaller than c1,t h a ti s ,r ≥ c1,
can easily ﬁt in the common-support case, which we addressed in the previous
section. It suﬃces, for example, to concentrate at r the probabilities spread by
the valuation distributions over the intervals [ci,r] in order to obtain valuation
distributions with the same support [r,d] that will give rise to the same equilibria
as the initial distributions. The results of the previous section thus apply to
this case. As in the previous section, when (i) in Theorem 1 (Section 2) holds
true, that is, r>c 1, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follow from
U.2 (Section 3) and log-concavity is unnecessary.
Assume next r<c 1. The results in Lebrun (1999a) according to which
every equilibrium is pure and such that its inverse bid functions satisfy the
diﬀerential system (1) and the initial condition (3) in the characterization C.1
(Section 3) go through to this case. However, the initial condition (2) has
to be changed. In general, there will exist an inﬁnity of possible substitutes
for this initial condition and, thus, an inﬁnity of equilibria. Focusing only
on the equilibria where the bids are not strictly larger than the valuations,
that is, eliminating weakly dominated strategies, allows to determine a unique
initial condition and to obtain uniqueness of the equilibrium. Maskin and Riley
(1996) and Lebrun (1999b) obtain this new initial condition (2”’) below, which
a p p l i e sa l s ot ot h ec a s er ≥ c1, mainly by ruling out deviations by bidder 1 with
valuation max(r,c1) from β1 (max(r,c1)), which we denote by v .
Deﬁnition 1: L e t( A 1 )i nA s s u m p t i o n sA . 1b es a t i s ﬁed. Assume di >r ,
for all i.L e t c(1) be the largest lower extremity and c(2) the second largest




that is deﬁned in (17) below:






C.4 Characterization with Possibly Diﬀerent Lower Extremities:
Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume Fi (ci)=0and di = d>r ,f o ra l l
i. Without loss of generality, assume also c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci, for all i ≥ 2.
The characterization C.1 holds true for equilibria where bidders submit at
most their valuations if 13 ( 2 )i sr e p l a c e db y( 2 ” ’ )b e l o w :
αi (v)=v, for all, except possibly one, i between 1 and n (2”’)
where v is as in Deﬁnition 1.
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 7 ) ,v is the maximum of the arguments b that would maximize
bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ (c1 − b)
Q
i>1 Fi (b) if his valuation was c1 and if the
other bidders bid their valuations. For the sake of completeness, we provide a
proof of (2”’) in Appendix 3 (see Lemma A3.2-2).
Under (ii) in Theorem 1 (Section 2), that is, c1 >c 2, the deﬁnition (De-
ﬁnition 17) of v implies14 v >c 2. In this case, uniqueness follows from U.2
(Section 3) by concentrating at v the probabilities Fi([ci,v]), for all i>1.
If (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2 are not satisﬁed, that is if c1 = c2 ≥ r,D e ﬁnition
(17) of v implies c2 = c1 = v. From Lemma 1 (Section 3) and from, since
the valuation distributions are atomless, Fk (v)=Fk (ck)=0 ,f o rk =1 ,2,
the initial condition (2”’) reduces to (2”) in C.3 (Section 3) where c has been
replaced by v = c1. Under the assumption (iii) in Theorem 1 (Section 2)
of strict log-concavity in an interval (v,v+ δ)=( c1,c 1 + δ),w i t hδ>0,t h e
proof, from the previous section, for a common support goes through to this
case. Theorem 1 thus holds true when the upper extremities of the supports
are identical.
5.2 Extension to Possibly Diﬀerent Lower and Upper Extremities
We now extend our proof of Theorem 1 (Section 2) to the case where even the
upper extremities of the supports may diﬀer. Let the assumptions of Theorem
1 (Section 2) be satisﬁed. Thus, ci ≤ c2 ≤ c1, for all i ≥ 2,a n dFi (ci)=0 ,f o r
all i.L e t d(i) be the (n−i+1)th order statistics of (d1,...,dn),t h a ti s ,t h eith




is the n-tuple (d1,...,dn)
rearranged by order of nonincreasing value. Since the case where only one
bidder can have valuations strictly larger than r is simple and uninteresting15,
we assume that d(2) >r .
We ﬁrst extend the characterization C.4. The lowest serious bid v is as
deﬁn e di nD e ﬁnition 1 in the previous subsection. In any equilibrium, the
15bidders whose valuations are never larger than v cannot obtain strictly positive
payoﬀs and engage only in “nonserious” bidding. Thus, the characterization
involves only those bidders who can have valuations strictly larger than v.L e t
n0 be the number of those bidders and let J ⊆ I = {1,...,n} be the set of their
i n d i c e s . W eh a v eD e ﬁnition 2 below.





is the n-tuple such that d(1) ≥ ... ≥ d(n) and there exists
a permutation π : {1,...,n} → {1,...,n} such that d(i) = dπ(i),f o ra l li in
{1,...,n}.
(ii) Assume d(2) >r .T h e n , J is the subset of {1,...,n} such that
J = {j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n and dj >v }.
(iii) Assume d(2) >r .T h e n , n0 is the number of elements of J,t h a ti s ,
n0 =# J.
From the previous deﬁnition, if n0 <nthen d(n0+1) ≤ v <d (n0).I n o r d e r
to describe the new boundary condition at the maximum bid, we deﬁne the
integer-valued function k(η) and the real-valued function d(η) below.
Deﬁnition 3: Assume c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci,f o ra l li ≥ 2,a n dd(2) >r .










































,t h e r e
exists one and only one k(η) as in Deﬁnition 3 (i) above. From the deﬁnitions
of d(η) and k(η) above, we have16
dk(η)+1 <d(η) ≤ dk(η).
16C.5 below is our most general characterization.
C.5 Characterization with Possibly Diﬀerent Lower and Upper
Extremities: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume Fi (ci)=0 ,f o ra l l
i. Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci,f o ra l li ≥ 2.L e t v be as




as in Deﬁnition 2. Assume d(2) >r .L e t
J,n0,and d(.) be as in Deﬁnitions 2 and 3.
There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where bidders submit at most their
valuations. In every such equilibrium, bidder i ∈ J follows a bid function βi,




such that, for all i ∈ J, there exists a continuous extension of βi
to the interval [v,max(di,d(η))] that is diﬀerentiable with a strictly positive
derivative everywhere over this interval, except possibly at di or when its value
is equal to v, and such that the inverses (αi)i∈J of these extensions, where
diﬀerentiable, satisfy the system of diﬀerential equations (1)—considered over
the domain D0 = {(b,α1,...,αn)|ci,b<α i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n}—in C.1 (Section
3), the boundary conditions (2”’) in C.4, and (3’) below:
αi (η)=m a x( di,d(η)),( 3 ’ )
for all i ∈ J.
The above characterization can easily be proved as Lebrun (1999a) proved
the characterization C.1 (Section 3) with common supports18.
In the general characterization C.5, if i is such that v <d i <d(η),t h eb i d
function βi is extended to the interval [v,d(η)], which is strictly larger than
the actual support, truncated at v, [v,d i] of bidder i’s valuation. We also
denote this extension by βi. When (1), (2”’), and (3’) hold true, this extension





with probability zero, βi (vi) is a best response from bidder





As in the previous subsection, η is the highest bid that can actually be
submitted19. However, contrary to the previous subsection, only some bidders
bid η at the upper extremities of their valuation supports. As we show in
Appendix 3.2 (see also Maskin and Riley 1996), d(η) deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3 is
the smallest upper extremity of the support at which a bidder bids the highest
bid η.S i n c e a n y k such that dk = d(1) or dk = d(2) satisﬁes the inequality
dk ≥ d(η), (3’) implies that η is the actual maximum bid of any bidder whose
extremity of his support is the largest or the second largest. On the other hand,
if bidder k’s upper extremity of the support dk >vis strictly smaller than d(η),
bidder k’s actual maximum bid βk (dk) will be20 strictly smaller than η.
Also as in the previous sections and subsection, no two solutions as in C.5
of (1) and (3’) can correspond to the same value of the parameter η. For all
i such that v <d i <d(η),( 3 ’ )r e q u i r e sav a l u eo fαi at η that is outside the
17support of Fi. Outside its support, the cumulative function Fi is constant and
the equation in (1) reduces to:
0=−
n0 − 2






αj (b) − b
,(19)
for all i such that v <d i <d(η). We obtain one such equation for all i such
that v <d i <d(η). Solving the system these equations form, we see that, for
any such i, the function αi is determined by the functions αj,w i t hj such that
dj ≥ d(η). Because this system is symmetric in αi and since there are exactly
k(η) values of j such that dj ≥ d(η), αi is equal to the same function—the
solution of the equation (20) below—for all i such that v <d i <d(η):
1








αj (b) − b
(20).
Replacing in the system (1), the functions αi, i such that v <d i <d(η),b yt h e i r
expressions (20) as functions of αj, j such that dj ≥ d(η), we obtain a system of
diﬀerential equations with the only unknowns αj, j such that dj ≥ d(η).T h i s
system is actually the system (1) we obtain when only the k(η) bidders j, j
such that dj ≥ d(η), are present. That is, it is the system (21) below:
d
db



















for all j such that dj ≥ d(η).
This last system (21) and the initial condition (3’) satisfy the standard as-
sumptions of the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations and only one solution
exists. The initial condition (3’) thus locally determines αj, for all j such that
dj ≥ d(η), and, through the equations (19), the function αi, for all i such that
v <d i <d(η). We then extend these unique solutions below η until the com-
mon function αi, i such that di <d (η), takes as its value the highest upper
extremity strictly smaller than d(η). At the bid where this next higher upper
extremity will be reached, we will add all functions αi of the bidders with this
upper extremity of their supports to the system (21), to which we may apply
again the standard theory of diﬀerential equations. The remaining functions
αk will be determined through equations similar to (21). Continuing in this
fashion, we see that the value of the parameter η determines the solution of (1)
and (3”).
Moreover, the property, stated in Lemma 2 (Section 3), of monotonicity of
the solution of the diﬀerential system with respect to η extends to (1) and (3’)
(for a proof, see Lemma A5.2-2 in Appendix 5.2). The proof of Theorem 1
can then proceeds as in the case of common upper extremities, in the previous
subsection.
186. Conclusion
We addressed the issue of uniqueness of the equilibrium in ﬁrst-price auctions
with independent private valuations in the general case of possibly diﬀerent
supports. By a simple geometric argument, consisting in “sliding” a solution of
the diﬀerential system down the 45-degree line, we showed that the equilibrium
is unique when the valuation cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-
concave near the highest lower extremity of their supports.
Appendix 1
Lemma A1-1: Let Asssumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume further ci = c,
di = d, for all i,a n dr ≤ c. Let (α1,...,αn) b eas o l u t i o no v e ra ni n t e r v a l
(γ,γ0],w i t hc ≤ γ<γ 0 <d ,o ft h ed i ﬀerential system (1) considered in the
domain D and such that d
dbα1 (γ0) > 0,..., d
dbαn (γ0) > 0.T h e n d
dbα1 (b) >
0,..., d
dbαn (b) > 0, for all b in (γ,γ0].
Proof: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,c o n s i d e rb0
i deﬁned as follows:
b0





lnFi (αi (b)) > 0, for all b in (b0,γ0]
¾
.
For αi (b) ∈ (c,d],w eh a v e d
db lnFi (αi (b)) > 0 if and only if d
dbαi (b) > 0
and d
db lnFi (αi (b)) < 0 if and only if d
dbαi (b) < 0. From (1), we see that
d
db lnF1α1,..., d
db lnFnαn are continuous over (γ,γ0].S i n c e d
dbαi (γ0) > 0,w e
have d
db lnFi (αi (γ0)) > 0 and b0
i <γ 0, for all i. We want to prove that
b0
1,...,b0
n = γ. From their deﬁnitions, we know that b0
1,...,b0
n ≥ γ. We will thus
have proved Lemma A1-1 if we prove that maxk b0
k ≤ γ.
Suppose that maxk b0
k >γ .L e t i be such that b0
i =m a x k b0
k.F r o m
the continuity of d







k we also have d
db lnFkαk (b0
i) ≥ 0 and, thus, d
dbαk (b0
i) ≥ 0,
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.F r o m ( 1 ) , w e h a v e :
(αi (b) − b)
d
db






−(n − 2) +
X
k6=i
αi (b) − b




























αi (b) − 1
¶










19for all b in (γ,γ0].
If we substitute b0
i to b in (A1-1), the expression between brackets in the sum
in the R.H.S. is equal to (αi (b0
i) − αk (b0




i).F r o m ( 1 ) ,
we have d
db lnFk (αk (b0
i))− d









, for all k.
Since d
db lnFi (αi (b0
i)) = 0 and d
db lnFk (αk (b0
i)) ≥ 0,w eh a v eαi (b0
i) ≤ αk (b0
i),
for all k. The sum between brackets in the sum in the R.H.S. of (A1-1) is
thus nonpositive. Moreover, there exists k such that the corresponding term
is strictly negative. In fact, from equation (4) (with j = i)t h e r ee x i s t sk 6= i
such that d
db lnFk (αk (b0
i)) > 0 and, thus, d
dbαk (b0
i) > 0. Consequently, from
(A1-1) the derivative of the function (αi (b) − b) d
db lnFi (αi (b)) at b = b0
i is
strictly negative and this function is strictly decreasing in a neighborhood of b0
i.
However, since d
db lnFi (αi (b0
i)) = 0, the value of this function at b = b0
i is equal
to zero. There thus exists ε>0 such that (αi (b) − b) d
db lnFi (αi (b)) < 0,
for all b in (b0
i,b 0
i + ε).S i n c e (αi (b) − b) > 0, for all b in (γ,γ0],w eo b t a i n
d
db lnFi (αi (b)) < 0, for all b in (b0
i,b 0
i + ε). This contradicts the deﬁnition of b0
i
a n dw eh a v ep r o v e dL e m m aA 1 - 1 . ||
Lemma A1-2: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume further ci = c,
di = d, for all i,a n dr ≤ c. Let (α1,...,αn) be a solution over (γ,η] of (1) and
(3) with c<η<d .T h e n , d
dbα1 (b) > 0,..., d
dbαn (b) > 0, for all b in (γ,η].
Proof: By substituting in (1) η to b and d to αi (b), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,w e
see that (3) implies d
dbαi (d)= 1
(n−1)fi(d)(d−η) > 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Lemma
A1-2 then follows from Lemma A1-1. ||
In Lemma A5.1-4, we extend Lemma A1-2 to the model with possibly dif-
ferent supports.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2( S e c t i o n3 ) : From Lemma A1-2, α1,...,αn are
strictly increasing over (γ,η] and thus αi (η0) <α ∗
i (η0)=d, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Deﬁne g in [max(γ,γ0),η0] as follows:
g =i n f{b ∈ [max(γ,γ0),η0]|α∗
i (b0) >α i (b0), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all b0 ∈ (b,η0]}.
We want to prove that g =m a x ( γ,γ0).W e a l r e a d y k n o w t h a t g<η 0.
Suppose that g>max(γ,γ0). By continuity, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
α∗
i (g)=αi (g).F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of g,w ea l s oh a v eα∗
j (g) ≥ αj (g), for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Moreover, there exists j 6= i such that α∗
j (g) >α j (g).O t h e r w i s e ,
the solutions (α1,...,αn) and (α∗
1,...,α∗
n) of the diﬀerential system (1) would
coincide at g and, from the uniqueness of the solution of (1,3), over their common
deﬁnition domain. However, thus is impossible since αk (η0) <α ∗
k (η0)=d,f o r
all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
From (1), d
dbαi (g) is a strictly decreasing function of αj (g), for all j 6= i.
Consequently, d
dbαi (g) > d
dbα∗
i (g). There thus exists δ>0 such that αi (b) >
α∗
i (b), for all b in (g,g + δ). This contradicts the deﬁnition of g and Lemma 2
is proved. ||
20In Lemma A5.2-2, we extend Lemma 2 to the model with possibly diﬀerent
supports.
Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 3 (Section 4):L e t i be between 1 and n.S i n c e αi
is strictly increasing over (c,c + γ],s oi sb αi over (c − ε,c + γ − ε] and, thus,
b αi (b) < b αi (c + γ − ε)=αi (c + γ) − ε<c+ δ − ε, for all b in (c − ε,c + γ − ε]
and, in particular, for all b in (c,c + γ − ε]. W eh a v ep r o v e dt h es e c o n di n -
equality in (9).
Since (α1,...,αn) is a solution of (1)—considered on the domain D—over the in-
terval (c,c + γ], (b,α1 (b),...,αn (b)) b e l o n g st ot h i sd o m a i n ,f o ra l lb in (c,c + γ],
and, thus, for b = c + ε.C o n s e q u e n t l y , αi (c + ε) >c + ε and b αi (c)=
αi (c + ε)−ε>c , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.S i n c e b αi (b) > b αi (c), for all b in (c,c + γ − ε]
and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,t h eﬁrst inequality in (9) follows.
From (8), we have d
dbb αi (b)= d
dbαi (b + ε) and, from (1) and the strict positiv-














> 0, for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition (8) of















.I n t h e
ﬁrst ratio of the R.H.S., we can replace αi (b + ε) by its value b αi (b)+ε and




Fi (b αi (b)+ε)


















for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, from (9), b αi (b) and
b αi (b)+ε belongs to the interval (c,c + γ] where Fi is strictly log-concave and,




fi(b αi(b)), for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and (A2-1) implies (10). ||
P r o o fo fL e m m a4( S e c t i o n4 ) :L e t b∗ be the smallest argument b in
[c,c + γ − ε) such that (12) holds true everywhere in (b,c + γ − ε],t h a ti s ,
b∗ =i n f{b00 ∈ [c,c + γ − ε]|b αi (b) < e αi (b), for all b in (b00,c+ γ − ε] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
From (11), the set in this deﬁnition of b∗ is not empty. Suppose that b∗ >c .
Then, there exists i between 1 and n such that b αi (b∗)=e αi (b∗) and b αj (b∗) ≤
e αj (b∗), for all j 6= i. From Lemma 3, we have
d
db
b αi (b∗) >
Fi (b αi (b∗))

















21From b αi (b∗)=e αi (b∗) and b αj (b∗) ≤ e αj (b∗), for all j 6= i, the R.H.S. of the in-

















b αi (b∗) >
Fi (e αi (b∗))

















However, from (1), the R.H.S. of this last inequality is d








Since b αi and e αi coincide at b∗ and since, at the same point, the derivative of b αi
is strictly larger than the derivative of e αi,t h ef u n c t i o nb αi must be larger than
e αi to the right of b∗, that is, there must exist ζ>0 such that b αi (b) > e αi (b),f o r
all b in (b∗,b ∗ + ζ). However, this contradicts the deﬁnition of b∗ and we have
proved that b∗ cannot be strictly larger than c and is, thus, equal to c.T h e
inequalities (12) hold true for all b in (c,c + γ − ε] a n dw eh a v ep r o v e dL e m m a
4. ||
Appendix 3
In this appendix, we prove that the equilibrium strategies satisfy (2”’) and
( 3 ’ ) . W ed e n o t eb yGi the continuous from the right cumulative distribution
function of bidder i’s marginal bid distribution. For any distribution H,w e
denote its support by SuppH.
As t r a t e g yβi of bidder i deﬁnes21 conditional bid probability distributions
βi (.|v), for all v in the support [ci,d i] of Fi. A n-tuple (β1,...,βn) of strategies
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if βi (.|v) is a best reply against the
other bidders’ strategies, for all bidder i and for all valuation v in the support
of Fi.
For all i and v such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and v ≥ r, we consider the function
(v − b)I {b ≥ r}
Q
j6=i Gj (b).T h e f u n c t i o n I {b ≥ r} is the indicator function of
the set {b ≥ r}. I ti st h u se q u a lt o0 if b<ra n dt o1i fb ≥ r.W e a l s o c o n s i d e r
the following maximization problem maxb∈R (v − b)I {b ≥ r}
Q
j6=i Gj (b).T h i s
would be the maximization problem of bidder i with valuation v if bidder i won
every tie in which he was involved. In this case,
Bi (v) = argmax
b∈R




would be bidder i’s “best bid correspondence.” This correspondence Bi is non-
empty valued since the maximization problem has always at least one solution.
22In fact, (v − b)I {b ≥ r}
Q
j6=i Gj (b) is nonpositive if b ≥ v,i se q u a lt o0i fb ≤ r,
and is strictly positive and upper semi-continuous over [r,v). W ed e n o t eb y
biu (v) the supremum of Bi (v) and by bil (v) its inﬁmum. From its deﬁnition and
following standard lines (or directly by log-super modularity, see Milgrom and
Shannon 1994 or Theorems 2.8.6 and 2.8.7 pp82-83 in Topkis 1998), it is simple
to prove (for a direct proof, see Appendix 6 in Appendix 1, Lebrun 1999b) that







that is, that biu (v) ≤ bil (v0), for all max(minSupp
Q
j6=i Gj,r) ≤ v<v 0.M o r e -
over, biu and bil are nondecreasing over R.
For a n-tuple (β1,...,βn) of strategies, we denote by Pi (v) bidder i’s (interim)
expected payoﬀ when his valuation is v, when he bids according to βi (.|v), and
when the other bidders bid according to βj, j 6= i. W ea l s od e n o t eb yPi (v;b)
and by Pr(i wins|b), bidder i’s expected payoﬀ and probability of winning when
his valuation is v,w h e nh eb i d sb, and when the other bidders bid according to
βj, j 6= i.T h u s , Pi (v;b)=( v − b)Pr(i wins|b) and the expected payoﬀ Pi (v)
is the expectation of Pi (v;b) when b is distributed according to βi (.|v).
For any bid b ≤ v, bidder i with valuation v can obtain expected payoﬀs
approaching the nonnegative payoﬀ (v − b)I {b ≥ r}
Q
j6=i Gj (b) by submitting
bids approaching b from above. Consequently, at any equilibrium the corre-
spondence Bi restricted to the support [ci,d i] of Fi is actually the best bid
correspondence of bidder i and the expected payoﬀ Pi (v) is equal to the value
of the maximization problem in the deﬁnition (A3-1) of Bi (v), for all i and v
such that v ∈ [ci,d i].M o r e o v e r , biu (v) i st h es u p r e m u mo ft h es e to fb i d sb
that give bidder i t h es a m ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ Pi (v;b) as the distribution βi (.|v)
does, that is, such that Pi (v;b)=Pi (v),a n dbil (v) is the inﬁmum of this set,
for all i and v such that v ∈ [ci,d i].
Let v b et h em a x i m u mo ft h er e s e r v ep r i c ea n dt h em i n i m u mo ft h es u p p o r t
of the highest bid, that is, v =m a x ( m i n Supp
Q
i Gi,r). It is straightfor-
ward to show that, at any equilibrium, no bidder bids a bid b>vwith (ex-
ante or marginal) strictly positive probability. Consequently, Pr(i wins|b)= Q
j6=i Gj (b), for all i and b>v . The probability Pr(i wins|b) that a bid-
der i wins the auction with a bid b is continuous with respect to b>vand
we havePi (v;b)=( v − b)Pr(i wins|b), for all i and b>v ,a n dPi (v)=
(v − biu (v))Pr(i wins|biu (v)), for all v ∈ [ci,d i] such that biu (v) >v .
Appendix 3.1
Lemma A3.1-1: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed 22. Assume also d1,...,dn >
r. Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci,f o ra l li ≥ 2. Let
(β1,...,βn) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where bidders do not submit bids
strictly larger than their valuations and let v be the minimum of the support of
the maximum of r and the highest bid. Then, we have






23Proof: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,l e tmi be the maximum of ci and r,t h a t
is, mi =m a x ( ci,r) and let gi be the minimum of the support of bidder i’s
marginal bid distribution Gi. Then, v = max(maxi gi,r)=m a x i (gi,r).S i n c e
bidder i does not bid strictly above his valuation, we have gi ≤ ci and, thus,
max(gi,r) ≤ mi, for all i.C o n s e q u e n t l y , v ≤ m1 =m a x i mi.
Let j be such that v =m a x ( gj,r). Since bidder j bids at most his
valuation, we have v ≤ mj. Suppose that there exists i 6= j such that v <m i.
If max(gi,r) <v ,w ew o u l dh a v emax(gi,r) <v<m i = ci. However, the best
response from bidder i with valuation vi ≥ ci cannot be strictly smaller than v
since his payoﬀ would be zero, while he could obtain a strictly positive payoﬀ by
submitting (v + ci)/2 instead. Consequently, max(gi,r) <vis impossible and
we have v ≤ max(gi,r).S i n c e v < max(gi,r) would contradict the deﬁnition
of v,w em u s th a v ev =m a x ( gi,r).W e h a v e p r o v e d t h a t v =m a x ( gi,r),
for all i 6= j such that v <m i.F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of j, we therefore have
v =m a x( gi,r), for all i such that v <m i.
Suppose that there exist i and k such that v <m i and v <m k.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
we have ci = mi, ck = mk >r . Bidder i with valuation vi ≥ ci will not submit
bids strictly below r, since such bids would bring him a zero payoﬀ, while he
can obtain strictly positive payoﬀs. Consequently, gi ≥ r. Similarly, gk ≥ r.
From mi, mk >vand the result of the previous paragraph, we would have v =
max(gi,r)=m a x( gk,r) and, thus, v = gi = gk. At most one bidder among the
bidders i and k can bid v with strictly positive marginal probability23. Without
loss of generality, assume bidder k bids v with probability zero. Then bidder k
submits bids strictly larger than gk = v with probability one. Since gi = v,f o r
all ε>0 there exists a Borel set of strictly positive Fi-measure such that bidder
i bids within [v,v+ ε) with a strictly positive probability for all valuation vi
in this set. However, as ε tends towards zero the probability of winning tends
towards zero and so does the expected payoﬀ for such bids, while by bidding
instead (vi + v)/2, for all such valuation vi,b i d d e ri c a no b t a i naﬁxed strictly
positive expected payoﬀ. Consequently, there do not exist two such values i
and k of the index and we must have m2 ≤ v ≤ m1.
If m2 = m1, the lemma is immediate. For the rest of the proof, we will thus
assume that m2 <m 1. As a particular consequence, we have r<m 1 = c1.
From the deﬁnition of v,i fmax(g1,r) <vthen there exists k>1 such that
max(gk,r)=v and, since v >rin this case, gk = v. Since bidders do
not bid strictly above their valuations, we have v ≤ ck = mk. However,
m2 ≤ v ≤ m1 and, thus, v = m2. The assumption m2 <m 1 then implies
v <m 1. This last inequality and max(g1,r) <vcontradict the result of
the second paragraph of this proof and, thus, max(g1,r) <vis impossible.
Consequently, v =m a x ( g1,r).S i n c e v ≤ m1 = c1, bidder 1 with valuation
v1 >c 1 does not bid strictly below r since it would give him a zero payoﬀ, while
he can obtain strictly positive payoﬀ.C o n s e q u e n t l y , g1 ≥ r and v = g1.
Since v = g1 belongs to the support of bidder 1’s bid distribution and from
the monotonicity of the best bid correspondence already mentioned above, there
exists a sequence (vn,b n)n≤1 such that bn belongs to the support of the bidder
1’s bid distribution β1 (.|vn) conditional on vn ,s u c ht h a tvn tends towards m1
24and bn tends towards v from above as n tends towards +∞,a n ds u c ht h a tbn is a
best response from bidder 1 with valuation vn,t h a ti s ,(vn − bn)
Q
j6=1 Gj (bn) ≥
(vn − b)
Q
j6=1 Gj (b), for all b ≥ maxj6=1 (gj,r).B y m a k i n g n tend towards +∞




Gj (v) ≥ (m1 − x)
Y
j6=1
Gj (x),( A 3 . 1 - 1 )
for all x ≥ maxj6=1 (gj,r) and in particular for all x in24 [m2,m 1].
The inequality (A3.1-1) already allows us to rule out the case v = m1.I n
fact, if v = m1 the L.H.S. of (A3.1-1) is equal to zero while the R.H.S. is strictly
positive for m2 <x<m 1,s i n c egj ≤ m2, for all j 6=1 .W e t h u s h a v e
v <m 1. Since bidders do not bid strictly higher than their valuations, we have








for all x in [m2,m 1].
In this paragraph, we show that Gj (v)=Fj (v), for all j 6=1 .S i n c e g1 = v,
bids b<vfrom bidder j 6=1have a zero probability of winning (either v = r
and b is strictly smaller than the reserve price or v = g1 >rand b is strictly
smaller than the bid from bidder 1 with probability one). Consequently, bidder
j 6=1with valuation vj >vwill not submit a bid strictly smaller than v.S i n c e
bidder j does not bid strictly above his valuation, bidder j with valuation vj ≤ v
will only submit bids b ≤ v.T h e o n l y w a y Gj (v) may thus be diﬀerent from
Fj (v) is if, with strictly positive probability, bidder j with valuation vj >v
bids v. I ft h i si st h ec a s et h eb i dv from bidder j 6=1must have a strictly
positive probability of winning and thus G1 (v)=G1 (g1) > 0 and v must be
a mass point of bidder 1’s bid distribution. It is then in the best interest of
bidder j with valuation vj >vto bid slightly above v rather than at v.T h i s i s
impossible at an equilibrium and we ﬁnd Gj (v)=Fj (v), for all j 6= i.T h e n




Fj (v) ≥ (m1 − x)
Y
j6=1
Fj (x),( A 3 . 1 - 3 )
for all x in [m2,m 1],a n dv belongs to maxb∈[m2,m1] (m1 − x)
Q
i>1 Fi (x).










Fj (v) ≥ (m1 − x0)
Y
j6=1








Fj (v)=( m1 − x0)
Y
j6=1




25From the second equation in (A3.1-4) and the strict positivity of the value of
the maximization problem maxx∈[m2,m1] (m1 − x)
Q





j6=1 Fj (x0) > 0.S i n c e Gj (x0) ≥ Fj (x0), for all j,
we ﬁnd Gj (x0)=Fj (x0), for all j 6=1 . For all j and x0 >v , bju(x0) <x 0
(if bju(x0) ≥ x0, bju(x0) >vand thus maxb∈R (x0 − b)I {b ≥ r}
Q
k6=j Gk (b)=
Pj (x0;bju(x0)) ≤ 0, which is impossible since bidder j c a no b t a i nas t r i c t l yp o s -
itive payoﬀ by bidding strictly between v and x0). From the monotonicity of Bj,
bidder j with valuation vj ≤ x0 bids at most bju(x0).W e t h u s h a v e Fj (x0) ≤
Gj (bju(x0)) ≤ Gj (x0)=Fj (x0), for all j 6=1 ,a n dGj ((bju(x0),x 0]) = 0, for all
j 6=1 . However, it is simple to show (for example, as in Lebrun 1999a or 1997),
that at least two bidders bid with a strictly positive probability in the neighbor-
hood of every bid between v and the maximum η of the support of the highest bid
(η =m a x 1≤i≤n SuppGi). Consequently, x0 must be strictly larger than η.T a k e
x00 such that η<x 00 <x 0. Then, from (A3.1-4) we have (m1 − v)
Q
j6=1 Fj (v) <
(m1 − x00)
Q
j6=1 Gj (x00)=( m1 − x00). This inequality contradicts (A3.1-1) and
the equality (m1 − v)
Q
j6=1 Gj (v)=( m1 − v)
Q
j6=1 Fj (v). There must thus
not exist x0 as in the top of this paragraph. We have proved that v is equal to
maxargmaxb∈[max(r,c2),max(r,c1)] (max(r,c1) − b)
Q
i>1 Fi (b). The lemma then
follows. ||
Appendix 3.2
Once v is determined according to Lemma A3.1-1, in order to study the
equilibrium strategies above v we can assume that di >v , for all i,t h a ti s ,t h a t
J = {1,...,n},w h e r eJ is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2 (Section 5). If di was not
strictly larger than v,t h e nb i d d e ri would never submit bids strictly above v
at the equilibrium. The other bidder’s “serious bidding behaviors,” that is,
their bids above v would not be aﬀected if we simply dropped bidder i from
the list of bidders. Since, in this subappendix, we will work more with the
upper extremities d1,...,dn than with the lower extremities c1,...,cn,w ed r o p
our assumption c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ci, for all i ≥ 2, and we assume rather that di is
nonincreasing in i.T h u s , w e h a v e v <d n ≤ dn−1 ≤ ... ≤ d2 ≤ d1,w i t hv as
in Deﬁnition 1 (Section 5) where c1 and c2 have been replaced by, respectively,
the largest lower extremity c(1) and the second largest lower extremity c(2).W e
thus make the following assumptions.
Assumptions A.2:
v <d n ≤ dn−1 ≤ ... ≤ d2 ≤ d1,w h e r ev is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1
(Section 5).
It can easily be shown that the distribution of the highest acceptable bid is
not degenerate, that is, is not concentrated at v. With some strictly positive
probability, strictly higher bids are submitted.
Lemma A3.2-1: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let (β1,...,βn)
be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where bidders bid at most their valuations and
26let η be the maximum of b1u (d1),...,bnu (dn).I f biu (di)=η and dj ≥ di,t h e n
bju(dj)=η,f o ra l li,j.
Proof: Since, as we previously observed, the highest submitted bid is
strictly larger than v with strictly positive probability, we must have η>v .
Let i and j be such that biu (di)=η , dj ≥ di,a n dj 6= i.S i n c e η wins
with a strictly positive probability (equal to 1), we must have di >ηand, thus,
dj >η .S i n c e η>v , biu (di)=η ∈ Bi (di).T h e r e e x i s t s m such that:
Pj (dj;m)=Pj (dj).
Then, m ∈ Bj (dj) and bjl(dj) ≤ m ≤ bju(dj).M o r e o v e r , m cannot be
strictly smaller than v. Otherwise, from the monotonicity of Bj (dj) and from
Fj ({dj})=0 , v would not belong to the support of Gj, which would contradict
the deﬁnition of v.T h u s , m ≥ v.F r o m t h e d e ﬁnitions of Bi (di) and η and
from Gj (m)=1 ,w eﬁnd:
di − η =( di − η)
Y
k6=i
Gk (η) ≥ (di − m)
Y
k6=i




An immediate consequence of the previous inequality and of the inequality dj ≥
di is (A3.2-1) below:




From the continuity from the right of
Q
k6=j Gk and the deﬁnition of m,w e
have (dj − m)
Q
k6=j Gk (m)=( dj − m)Gi (m)
Q
k6=i,j Gk (m) ≥ Pj (dj;m)=
Pj (dj). (A3.2-1) thus implies:
Pj (dj;η) ≥ Pj (dj).
Thus, Pj (dj;η)=Pj (dj), η is an optimal bid for bidder j with valuation dj,
and η ≤ bju(dj). From the deﬁnition of η in the statement of the lemma,
η ≥ bju(dj) and, consequently, η = bju(dj). ||
Let η be the maximum of the support of the highest bid. Since no bid strictly
larger than η can be an optimal bid, we have biu (di) ≤ η, for all i.F r o m t h e
deﬁnition of η, it must belong to the support of at least one bid distribution
and must thus be among the optimal bids of at least one bidder. From the
monotonicity of biu, there must exist a bidder i such that biu (di)=η.I f t h e r e
was only one such bidder, all the other bidders would bid strictly below η with
probability one, and η would not be an optimal bid for bidder i since a slightly
smaller bid would give him a strictly higher expected payoﬀ. There must thus
exist at least two bidders i and j, i 6= j,s u c ht h a tbiu (di)=bju(dj)=η.F r o m
the previous lemma, for any other bidder k such that dk ≥ di or dk ≥ dj,w e
have bku (dk)=η.I n p a r t i c u l a r , bku(dk)=η, for all k =1 ,2 and, thus, η<d 2.
27As in Lebrun (1999a), we can show that the functions biu and bil are identi-
cal between them, continuous, and strictly increasing where, over [ci,d i],t h e i r
values are strictly larger than v. The equilibrium strategies thus never mix
between several bids strictly larger than v. At an equilibrium, a bidder i
with valuation v bids βi (v)=biu (v)=bil (v), for all v in [ci,d i] such that
biu (v) >v .
If r ≥ c1,t h e nv as deﬁned in Lemma A3.1-1 is equal to r and, as in the
common-support case, (2) and, thus, (2”’) hold true. From the proof of Lemma
A3.1-1, if r<c 1 then g1 = v , v is the minimum serious bid bidder 1 submits,
and bidder 1 bids at least v with probability one, with v as in Lemma A3.1-1 or
as Deﬁnition 1 (Section 5). Bidder j with valuation vj bids at least v and has a
strictly positive payoﬀ instead of the zero payoﬀ he would obtain by submitting
a bid strictly smaller than v, for all j>1 and all vj >v . Thus, the minimum of
the serious bids every bidder submits is v. Of course, no two bidders can submit
v with a (ex-ante or marginal) strictly positive probability, since otherwise there
would be a strictly positive probability of a tie at v and it would be in the best
interest of either of these two bidders to bid slightly higher. (2”’) follows.
Furthermore, as in Lebrun (1999a), the inverses α1,...,α n of these bid func-
tions can be shown to form a solution of the system (1) with initial condition
(A3.2-2) below:





= dj, for all j such that dj <d 2(A3.2-2).
In (A3.2-2), η is the maximum of the support of the highest bid and the ﬁrst
part of (A3.2-2) follows from Lemma A3.2-1. ηj is the maximum of the support
of bidder j’s bid. The following lemma then follows.
Lemma A3.2-2: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Assume
also Fi (ci)=0 , for all i.L e t (β1,...,βn) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
where bidders bid at most their valuations. Then, the strategy βi is a non-
decreasing bid function not smaller than v over (v,d i] and strictly increasing
and diﬀerentiable when its value is strictly larger than v, for all i.M o r e -
over, there exists η in (v,d 2) and ηj in (v,d j),f o ra l lj such that dj <
d2, such that the inverse bid functions α1 = β
−1
1 ,...,α n = β
−1
n are solutions
of the system (1) of diﬀerential equations—considered over the domain e D =
{(b,α1,...,αn)|v,b<α i ≤ di,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n}—with boundary conditions (2”’)
(in C.4 Section 5, with v deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1) and (A3.2-2).
We next show that if bidder i submits η at his upper extremity of this
support, that is, ηi = η,t h e ndi is not smaller than d(η) deﬁn e di nD e ﬁnition
3( S e c t i o n5 ) .
Lemma A3.2-3: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Assume also
Fi (ci)=0 , for all i.L e t η and ε be such that η<d i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
and ε>0.L e t (α1,...,α k) be a strictly increasing solution over [η − ε,η] with
28values in
Qk





















,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ k,( A 3 . 2 - 3 )
αi (η)=di, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,( A 3 . 2 - 4 ) .
Then, the following inequalities hold true:



















Proof:I t s u ﬃces to prove
dk ≥ d(k,η) (A3.2-6)
Since lnFiαi is strictly increasing over (η − ε,η],w eh a v e d
db lnFk (αk (η)) ≥ 0.






















From the deﬁnition of d(k,η), the R.H.S. of the last inequality is equal to
1
d(k,η)−η. (A3.2-6) follows immediately. ||
In the following proofs, the following notations will prove convenient.
Deﬁnition A3.2-1:
29(i) For all integers n and k,w ed e n o t eb yEn,k the n×k matrix whose













where in,1 is the column vector whose all n components are equal to 1.
(i) For all integer n,w ed e n o t et h es q u a r en × n matrix En,n simply
by En,t h es q u a r en × n identity matrix by In,a n dt h es q u a r en × n matrix
En − In by Kn. We have:





















The matrix Kn above is, thus, the n × n matrix whose all components on
t h em a i nd i a g o n a la r ee q u a lt o0a n da l lo ﬀ-diagonal components are equal to 1.
The technical lemma below follows easily from the equality K2
n =( n − 1)In +
(n − 2)Kn.
Lemma A3.2-4: For all integer n ≥ 1 and for all real number x, the matrix
xIn + Kn, where In and Kn are as in Deﬁnition A3.2-1, is regular (invertible)




(x − 1)(x + n − 1)
{(x + n − 2)In − Kn}.
Lemma A3.2-5: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Assume also
Fi (ci)=0 ,f o ra l li.L e t (β1,...,βn) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where
bidders bid at most their valuations. Then, the strategies are pure for the




and ηi <d i,η,f o r
all i such that di <d(η),s u c ht h a t(α1,...,αn) is a solution of the system (1)
and the initial condition (A3.2-7) below:
αi (η)=di, for all i such that di ≥ d(η), or, equivalently, such that i ≤ k(η)
αi (ηi)=di, for all i such that di <d(η), or, equivalently, such that i ≥ k(η)+1 . (A3.2-7)
Proof: We know that the equilibrium is pure for the valuations strictly
larger than v and that there exists ηi <d i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
30the inverse bid functions α1,...,αn are solutions of the system (1) and initial
conditions below:
αi (ηi)=di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let η be equal to the maximum of η1,...,ηn.F r o m ( A 3 . 2 - 2 ) , ηi = η<d 2,f o r
all i such that di ≥ d2. From Lemma A3.2-1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,i fηi = η,t h e n
ηj = η, for all j such that j ≤ i. There thus exists k ≥ 2 such that ηi = η,f o r
all i such that i ≤ k,a n dηi <η , for all i such that i>k . From Lemma A3.2-3,
dk ≥ d(k,η). Consequently, there exists k such that (α1,...,αn) satisﬁes the
initial conditions below:
αi (η)=di, for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
αi (ηi)=di, for all i such that k +1≤ i ≤ n,
with dk ≥ d(k,η) and di <d k and ηi <η , for all i such that i ≥ k +1 .
Let η0 be the maximum of the ηi,f o ri such that i ≥ k+1. Only the bidders





















, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.(A3.2-8)
For all i ≥ k +1,d e ﬁne over (η0,η] the function αi a st h es a m eu n i q u es o l u t i o n
of the equation below:
1







αj (b) − b
.(A3.2-9)
As we have deﬁned these functions, we have αk+1 = ... = αn,o v e r(η0,η],a n d

















where En−k,k is as deﬁned in Deﬁnition A3.2-1. As a simple computation





(k − 1)(n − 1)
(kIn−k + Kn−k)En−k,k, (A3.2-11)
where In−k and Kn−k are as in Deﬁnition 3.2-1. Substituting its value from
(A3.2-11) to 1

























αj (b) − b
¶
1≤j≤k
=( 0 ) k+1≤i≤n .
31Since, from Lemma A3.2-4, (k − 1)(n − 1)(kIn−k + Kn−k)
−1 =( n − 2)In−k −
Kn−k,w eh a v e
−((n − 2)In−k − Kn−k)
µ
1






αj (b) − b
¶
1≤j≤k



















for all k+1 ≤ i ≤ n.S i n c e Fi (αi (b)) = 0, for all b in (η0,η] and all k+1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we have d
db lnFi (αi (b)) = 0, for all b in (η0,η] and all k +1≤ i ≤ n.F r o m
(A3.2-12), the equations in (1) for k +1≤ i ≤ n thus hold true over (η0,η].

















where C = −(k − 2)Ik+Kk,w i t hIk and Kk as in Deﬁnition A3.2-1. A simple









Ek − (n − 2)Ik + Kk
¾
, (A3.2-14)




























where B = −(n − 2)Ik + Kk. Multiplying both sides of (A3.2-10) to the left
by the transpose Ek,n−k of En−k,k and making use of the immediate equality



























db lnFi (αi (b))
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32for all b in (η0,η] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. All equations in (1) thus hold true over
(η0,η] and (α1,...,αn) is a solution over (η0,η] of the system (1). Moreover,
from Lemma A5.1-4, d
dbαk+1(b)=... = d
dbαn(b) > 0, for all b in (η0,η).
Let i be not smaller than k+1and let v be in [di,d 1].I f b i d d e r i with valua-
tion v submits b in [η0,η], his expected payoﬀ is equal to (v − b)
Qk
j=1 Fj (αj (b)).





db ln(Fj (αj (b))).




db ln(Fj (αj (b)))





αj(b)−b. Consequently, from the deﬁnition (A3.2-9), the



















αj (b) − b
(A3.2-17).
Assume that di ≥ d(k,η) with i ≥ k+1. Then, since αi (η)=d(k,η) and αi





i=1 Fi (αi (b))
o
is strictly positive, for all b in [ηi,η) and v = di.S i n c e η gives a strictly higher
expected payoﬀ, ηi <ηis not a best reply from bidder i with valuation di,a s
it should at an equilibrium. This is impossible and, thus, di <d(k,η), for all
i ≥ k+1.S i n c e dk+1 <d(k,η) ≤ dk,w em u s th a v ek = k(η), di <d(k(η),η),
for all i ≥ k +1 ,a n ddi ≥ d(k(η),η), for all i ≤ k.S i n c e d(η)=d(k(η),η),
the lemma is proved. ||
Lemma A3.2-6: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Assume
also Fi (ci)=0 , for all i.L e t (β1,...,βn) be an equilibrium. Then, the bid
functions can be extended over larger inter v a l sa sb e s tr e p l yf u n c t i o n ss u c ht h a t
their inverses form a solution of the system (1) with initial condition (3’) in





Proof:L e t η0 be the maximum of ηi,f o ri>k(η). For all i ≥ k(η)+1 ,
we deﬁne αi over (η0,η] as in (A3.2-9). From (A3.2-9), we have αi (η)=d(η),
for all i ≥ k(η)+1. As in the proof of the previous lemma, we can show, from
(A3.2-8) and (A3.2-9), that (α1,...,αn) is a solution of (1) over (η0,η].W e n o w
show that, if αi is so deﬁned, then limb→>ηi αi (b)=di, for all i ≥ k(η)+1such
that ηi = η0.L e t i be such an index. Since ηi must be a best response from
bidder i with valuation di, the (right-hand) derivative (A3.2-17) at v = di and
b = ηi must not be strictly positive. Thus, we ﬁnd limb→>ηi αi (b) ≥ di.
Let j be the largest value of the index such that j ≥ k(η)+1and ηj =
η0.O v e r a n i n t e r v a l [η0 − ε,η0],w i t hε>0, the inverses of the bid functions
(βl)l s.t.ηl≥η0 satisfy the system below, similar to (A3.2-8):
d
db



















33for all i such that ηi ≥ η0 and all b in [η0 − ε,η0]. In (A3.2-18), s is the number of
index values l such that ηl ≥ η0 and αi is the inverse of bidder i’s equilibrium bid
function. Since βj is strictly increasing, dl














limb→>η0 αj(b)−η0. We obtain:
−
s − 2






di − η0 +
k(η) − 1
limb→>η0 αj (b) − η0 ≥ 0.
























dj − η0 +
k(η) − 1
limb→>η0 αj (b) − η0 ≥ 0.
Consequently, limb→>η0 αj (b) ≤ dj. From our deﬁnition of j,w et h u sh a v e
limb→>η0 αi (b) ≤ di, for all i ≥ k(η)+1such that ηi = η0.
We have proved that limb→>η0 αi (b)=di, for all i ≥ k(η)+1such that
ηi = η0. As a particular consequence, we have di = dj, for all i and j such that
ηi = ηj = η0.
For all i ≥ k(η)+1such that ηi = η0, we can thus deﬁne over [v,d(η)] the
continuous function αi that is equal to the inverse of the bid function βi over
[v,d i] and to the function deﬁned in (A3.2-9) over [di,d(η)]. Proceeding as in
the proof of the previous lemma, we can see, from (A3.2-9) and (A3.2-8), that
the inverses α1,...,αk(η),α i, i ≥ k(η)+1such that ηi = η0, satisfy the system
(A3.2-18) over the interval (η00,η],w h e r es is the number of index values i such
that ηi ≥ η0 and where η00 is the maximum of the ηj such that ηj <η 0.
We then deﬁne αi, for all i ≥ k(η)+1such that ηi <η 0,o v e r(η00,η0) as
follows:
1








αj (b) − b
.
For all such i, it is simple to show that the continuous extension of αi so deﬁned
at η0 agrees with the continuous extension of αi as we deﬁned it over (η0,η].
Again, from Lemma A5.1-4, αi is strictly increasing, and, proceeding as in the
proof of the previous lemma, we can then show that (α1,...,αn) is a solution of
(1) and (3’) over (η00,η]. As above, we can also show that limb→>η00 αi (b)=di,
for all i ≥ k(η)+1such that ηi = η00,a n ddi = dj, for all i and j such that
ηi = ηj = η00.
Repeating this construction, we see that the inverses of the bid functions
can be extended into solutions of (1) and (3’). Equivalently, the bid functions
can be extended such that the inverses of the extensions form a solution of (1)
34and (3’). Moreover, the extensions of the bid functions for diﬀerent bidders
agree in the complements of their valuation supports in the interval [v,d(η)].
Consequently, for all i, j such that di,d j ≤ d(η), ηi <η j if and only if di <d j.
From (A3.2-17), we can easily show that the value of the extension of the bid
function βi at vi in [di,d(η)] is the best bid from bidder i with valuation vi. ||
The characterization C.4 (Section 4) follows from Lemmas A3.2-2 and A3.2-
6.
Appendix 4
Lemma A4-1: Assume d1 ≥ ... ≥ dn. For all η<d 2, there exists one























Proof:L e t l be the largest value of the index i such that η<d i.F r o m
η<d 2,w eh a v el ≥ 2.E i t h e r l = n and η<d i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,o rl<n
and dl+1 ≤ η<d l.C o n s i d e r j such that 2 ≤ j ≤ l. A simple computation













Let Λ be the function deﬁned over {1,...,l} whose value at j is equal to the L.H.S.
of (A4-2). Since di is nonincreasing in i and since η<d l, Λ is a nondecrasing
function. Consequently, k =m a x{j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ l and Λ(j) ≤ 1} is the
only value of the index that satisﬁes (A4-1). ||
Appendix 5
In this appendix, we consider the system (1) of diﬀerential equations over the
domain D0 = {(b,α1,...,αn)|ci <α i and b<α i, for all i}.A n-tuple (α1,...,αn)
of continuous functions over (γ,γ0],w i t hγ<γ 0,i sp i e c e w i s ed i ﬀerentiable if and
35only if α1,...,αn are diﬀerentiable everywhere in (γ,γ0] except, possibly, at a ﬁ-
nite number of points, the left-hand derivatives dl
dbα1 (b),..., dl
dbαn (b) exist and
are ﬁnite, for all b in (γ,γ0], and the right-hand derivatives dr
dbα1 (b),..., dr
dbαn (b)
exist and are ﬁnite, for all b in (γ,γ0).A s o l u t i o n (α1,....,αn) of the system (1)
over (γ,γ0] is such a continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable n-tuple such that
(b,α1 (b),...,αn (b)) belongs to D0, for all b in (γ,γ0], (lnF1α1,...,lnFnαn) is
diﬀerentiable26 over (γ,γ0], and the equations (1) hold true over this interval.
Note that if (α1,...,αn) is a solution of (1) over (γ,γ0],s i n c eFi is diﬀer-
entiable over (ci,d i) with a strictly positive derivative over this interval, αi is
diﬀerentiable at b, for all b such that αi (b) ∈ (ci,d i) and all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Appendix 5.1
Lemma A5.1-1: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let (α1,...,αn)






lnFk (αk (b)) =
1




lnFj (αj (b)) −
d
db
lnFi (αi (b)) =
1
αi (b) − b
−
1
αj (b) − b
(A5.1-2),
for all 1 ≤ i,j ≤ n and b ∈ (η − ε,η].
Proof: By summing all equations in (1) except the ith equation, we ﬁnd
(A5.1-1). It suﬃces to subtract the ith equation in (1) from the jth equation
in order to prove (A5.1-2). ||
Lemma A5.1-2: L e tA s s u m p t i o n sA . 1a n dA . 2b es a t i s ﬁed. Let (α1,...,αn)
be a solution over (ζ − ε,ζ],w i t hε>0, of the system (1’) and the initial
condition (A5.1-3) below
αi (ζ)=fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (A5.1-3)
where di <f i and ζ<f i,f o ra l li>k ,a n dζ<f i ≤ di,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Assume that k ≥ 2 and that αi (b) >d i,f o ra l li>kand all b in (ζ − ε,ζ].
Then, (α1,...,αn) is a solution of (1) over (ζ − ε,ζ] if an only if:
d
db

















,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ k,(A5.1-4)
36and ak+1 (b)=... = αn (b) and αi (b) is the unique solution of the equation
(A5.1-5) below, for all b in (ζ − ε,ζ] and k +1≤ i ≤ n:
1







αj (b) − b
(A5.1-5).
:
Proof:A s s u m e (α1,...,αn) is a solution of (1). Since d
db lnFi (αi (b)) = 0,




















where A =( ( n − k)In−k − Kn−k),w i t hIn−k,K n−k, and En−k,k as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition A3.2-1. Thus, we have:
µ
1










(A5.1-5) then follows from (A5.1-7) and the equalities A−1 = 1
(k−1)(n−1) (kIn−k + Kn−k)
(from Lemma A3.2-4) and 1
(k−1)(n−1) (kIn−k + Kn−k)En−k,k = 1
k−1En−k,k.



















































The product Ek,n−kA−1En−k,k is equal to n−k
n−1Ek and the sum Ek,n−kA−1En−k,k+
B is equal to n−1
k−1 (−(k − 2)Ik + Kk). Substituting this value to the matrix
between braces in (A5.1-9) immediately gives (A5.1-4).
The proof that (A5.1-4) and (A5.1-5) imply (1) can proceed as in the proof
of Lemma A3.2-5. ||
Lemma A5.1-3: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let (α1,...,αn)
be a solution over (ζ − ε,ζ],w i t hε>0, of the system (1) and the initial condi-
tion (A5.1-3) in Lemma A5.1-2 above where di <f i and ζ<f i,f o ra l li>k ,
37and ζ<f i ≤ di,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume that k ≥ 2 and that αi (b) >d i,f o r
all i>kand all b in (ζ − ε,ζ],a n dt h a td
dbαj (ζ) ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.T h e n ,
d
dbαi (b) exists and
d
db
αi (b) > 0,( A 5 . 1 - 1 0 )
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all b in (ζ − ε,ζ),
αk+1 (b)=... = αn (b) <α j (b), (A5.1-11)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and b in (ζ − ε,ζ).M o r e o v e r ,
f1 = ... = fk ≤ fj,(A5.1-12)
and if d
dbαj (ζ) > 0,t h e n
f1 = ... = fk <f j,( A 5 . 1 - 1 3 )
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and k +1≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: From (A5.1-3) and (A5.1-4) in the previous lemma and from Lemma
A1-1, d
dbαi (b) exists and d
dbαi (b) > 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and all b in (ζ − ε,ζ).
The function αi is thus strictly increasing over (ζ − ε,ζ], for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.S i n c e
αi is strictly increasing over (ζ − ε,ζ] and αi (ζ)=fi ≤ di,w eh a v eαi (b) <d i,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since αj (b) <d j and d
dbαj (b) > 0,w eh a v e d
db lnFj (αj (b)) > 0, for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k a n dbi n(ζ − ε,ζ).M o r e o v e r ,d
db lnFi (αi (b)) = 0, for all k+1 ≤ i ≤ n
and b in (ζ − ε,ζ]. The equality (A5.1-2) in Lemma A5.1-1 thus implies
αi (b) <α j (b),(A5.1-14)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, k +1≤ i ≤ n,a n db in (ζ − ε,ζ). (A5.1-11) follows from
the previous inequality and from (A5.1-5) in the previous lemma. Making b in
(A5.1-11) tend towards ζ and using (A5.1-3), we ﬁnd (A5.1-12). If d
dbαj (ζ) > 0,
αj (ζ)=fj <d j implies dl
db lnFj (αj (ζ)) > 0, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.F r o m
d
db lnFi (αi (ζ)) = 0 and (A5.1-2) in Lemma A5.1-1, (A5.1-14) holds true at
b = ζ, for all k +1≤ i ≤ n. Substituting ζ to b in (A5.1-14) and using
(A5.1-3), we ﬁnd (A5.1-13).
From (A5.1-5) in the previous lemma, d
dbαi (b) exists, for all b in (ζ − ε,ζ)

















αi (b) − 1
¶








dbαi (b) ≤ 0. The expression between brackets in the R.H.S. of (A5.1-
15) would not be larger than (αi (b) − αj (b)) − (αi (b) − b) d
dbαj (b).S i n c e
38αi (b) ≤ αj (b), αi (b) >b ,a n d d
dbαj (b) > 0, every term in the sum in (A5.1-
15) would be strictly negative and the equality (A5.1-15) could not hold true.
Consequently, d
dbαi (b) > 0, for all b in (ζ − ε,ζ) and all k +1≤ i ≤ n,a n d
(A5.1-10) is proved. ||
Lemma A5.1-4: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let α1,...,αn
be continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable functions over (γ,η],w i t hγ<η ,s u c h
that (α1,...,αn) is a solution over this interval of the system (1) and the initial
condition (A5.1-16) below
αi (η)=fi, (A5.1-16)
where di <f i and η<f i, for all i>k ,a n dη<d i = fi and d(η) ≤ di = fi,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume that k ≥ 2 and that fi <d j, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k and
k +1≤ i ≤ n.T h e n ,αi is strictly increasing and d
dbαi (b) exists and
d
db
αi (b) > 0,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all b in (γ,η) such that αi (b) 6= di.
Proof: We can easily show that d(η) ≤ di, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, implies
d
dbαi (η) ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k (see the proof of Lemma A3.2-3) Lemma A5.1-4
then follows from repeated applications of Lemma A5.1-3. ||
Appendix 5.2
Lemma A5.2-1: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let α1,...,αn
be continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable functions over (γ,η],w i t hγ<η ,
such that (α1,...,α n) is a solution over this interval of (1) and (3’) for a value
η<d 2 of the parameter. Let α∗
1,...,α∗
n be continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable
functions over (γ,η0],w i t hγ<η 0,s u c ht h a t(α∗
1,...,α∗
n) is a solution over this
interval of (1) and (3’) for a value η0 <ηof the parameter. Then, α∗
i (η0) >
αi (η0),f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof:L e t L be the set of index values i deﬁned as follows:
L =
½
i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
d
db
lnFi (αi (η0)) = 0
¾
.
Let k be the minimum of L. From our assumption that di does not increase
with i, from (3’), and from Lemma A5.1-4, we have L = {k,...,n}. For all
1 ≤ i ≤ k(η),s i n c eαi (η)=di we have d
db lnFi (αi (η0)) > 0 and thus i/ ∈
L.C o n s e q u e n t l y , k>k (η).I n p a r t i c u l a r , k>2. For all i<k ,s i n c e
d
db lnFi (αi (η0)) > 0 we have αi (η0) <α i (η)=di = α∗
i (η0). For all i ≥ k,
39from d






Consequently, (αk (η0),...,α n (η0)) is a solution of the system below:
((n − 2)In−k+1 − Kn−k+1)
µ
1










where In−k+1, Kn−k+1,a n dEn−k+1,k−1 are as in Deﬁnition A3.2-1. From
Lemma A3.2-4, the matrix A =( ( n − 2)In−k+1 − Kn−k+1) is regular and its
inverse is equal to A−1 = 1
































Since all the elements in the inverse A−1 = 1
(k−2)(n−1) ((k − 1)In−k+1 + Kn−k+1)















All the elements in A−1 = 1
(k−2)(n−1) ((k − 1)In−k+1 + Kn−k+1) and En−k+1,n=k,
and thus in their product are strictly positive. Moreover, we have already
proved that α∗
j (η0) >α j (η0), for all j ≤ k − 1. (A5.2-2) and (A5.2-3) thus
imply 1
α∗
i (η0)−η0 < 1
αi(η0)−η0 or, equivalently, α∗
i (η0) >α i (η0), for all i ≥ k,a n d
the lemma is proved. ||
Lemma A5.2-2: Let Assumptions A.1 and A.2 be satisﬁed. Let α1,...,αn
be continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable functions over (γ,η],w i t hγ<η ,
such that (α1,...,αn) is a solution over this interval of (1) and (3’) for a value
η<d 2 of the parameter. Let α∗
1,...,α∗
n be continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable
functions over (γ,η0],w i t hγ<η 0,s u c ht h a t(α∗
1,...,α∗
n) is a solution over this
interval of (1) and (3’) for a value η0 <ηof the parameter. Then, α∗
i (b) >
αi (b), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all b in (γ,η0].
Proof: From the previous lemma, we have α∗
i (η0) >α i (η0), for all 1 ≤ i ≤
n.W e d e ﬁne h in (γ,η0] as follows:
h =i n f{b ∈ [γ,η0]|α∗
i (b0) >α i (b0), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all b0 in (b,η0]}.
We want to prove that h = γ.B y c o n t i n u i t y a n d α∗
i (η0) >α i (η0), for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n,w eh a v eh<η 0. Suppose that h>γ .T h e r e m u s t e x i s t i such that
40α∗
i (h)=αi (h). By continuity, we also have α∗
j (h) ≥ αj (h), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Moreover, there exists l 6= i such that α∗
l (h) >α l (h). In fact, if it was not
the case the continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable solutions (α1,...,α n) and
(α∗
1,...,α∗
n) would be equal at h and would thus be equal everywhere over their
common deﬁnition domain, which is impossible since α∗
i (η0) >α i (η0), for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Assume that d
db lnFi (αi (h)) = 0.F r o m ( 1 ) , w e h a v e
1











i (h)) ≥ 0 and (1), we have
1
α∗








j (h) − h
.(A5.2-5)
Since α∗
j (h) ≥ αj (h), for all j 6= i,a n dα∗
l (h) >α l (h), (A5.2-4) and (A5.2-5)
imply 1
α∗
i (h)−h < 1
αi(h)−h and thus α∗
i (h) >α i (h). This contradicts α∗
i (h)=
αi (h) and d
db lnFi (αi (h)) = 0 is impossible.
From the previous paragraph, we must have d
db lnFi (αi (h)) > 0 and, conse-
quently, αi (h) <d i.S i n c e α∗
i (h)=αi (h), we obviously have α∗
i (h) <d i and
d
db lnFi (α∗
i (h)) > 0.



















































i (h), αj (h) ≤ α∗
j (h), for all j,a n dαl (h) <α ∗
l (h),t h ei n -








There thus exists δ>0 such that αi (b) >α ∗
i (b), for all b in (h,h + δ).H o w -
ever, this contradicts the deﬁnition of h. W eh a v et h u sp r o v e dt h a th>γis
impossible and thus that h = γ. The lemma is proved. ||
Appendix 6
41Existing Results III (Lebrun 1999a): Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed.
Assume also ci = c, di = d,f o ra l li,a n dr ≤ c. If F1 = ... = Fm = G1








G2 (v) > 0,o v e r(c,d], is the assumption of (strict) reverse
hazard rate stochastic dominance by G1 over G2 (see Krishna 2002). Condi-
tionally on any interval [c,e],w i t hc ≤ e ≤ d, the distribution G1 ﬁrst order
dominates the distribution G2. A close examination of the proof in Lebrun
(1999a) reveals that this relation of stochastic dominance is only needed in a
nondegenerate interval with c as its lower extremity. We have the following
extension.
Extension of Results III: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume
also ci = c, di = d, for all i, r ≤ c, F1 = ... = Fm = G1,F m+1 = ... = Fn = G2,




G2 (v) > 0,f o ra l lv in (c,c + ε], then there exists one and only one
equilibrium.
In the proof of this extension above, we will use Lemma A6-1 below.
Lemma A6-1: Let Assumptions A.1 be satisﬁed. Assume ci = c, di = d,
for all i,a n dr ≤ c. Let F1,...,Fn be diﬀerentiable over (c,d] with derivatives
f1,...,fn locally bounded away from zero over this interval. Assume that there
exists δ>0, m, G1,a n dG2 such that G1 (c)=G2 (c)=0 , Fi = G1,f o r
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Fj = G2,f o ra l lm<j≤ n,a n d d
dv
G1
G2 (v) > 0, for all v
in (c,c + δ].L e t (β1,...,βn) and
³
e β1,..., e βn
´
be two diﬀerent equilibria of the






1, and e β
∗
2 such that βi = β
∗
1 and
e βi = e β
∗
1,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ m, βj = β
∗
2 and e βj = e β
∗
2,f o ra l lm<j≤ n.T h e r e
also exists γ>0 such that either ϕ∗
21 (v) < e ϕ
∗
21 (v),f o ra l lv in (c,c + γ),o r
ϕ∗
21 (v) > e ϕ
∗










2 ◦ e β
∗
1.
Proof:T h e ﬁrst part of Lemma A6-1 is from Corollary 3 (iv) in Lebrun
(1999a). From the property of monotonicity with respect to η (see Lemma

















2. Without loss of generality, we









Substituting in (1) α∗
1 to αi and G1 to Fi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,a n dα∗
2 to αj
and G2 to Fj, for all m+1≤ j ≤ n, and rearranging, the system (1) reduces to












1 (b) − (n − m − 1)α∗
2 (b) − b
(α∗
1 (b) − b)(α∗













2 (b) − (m − 1)α∗
1 (b) − b
(α∗
1 (b) − b)(α∗
2 (b) − b)
(A6-2).
42Since the bid functions are diﬀerentiable over (c,d] or since the derivatives






























, for all v in (c,d]. Dividing (A6-2) by (A6-1)
and simplifying, we ﬁnd that (ϕ∗
21,β
∗
1) is a solution over (c,d] of the system
(A6-3) and (A6-4) below —considered on the domain:












21 (v) − (m − 1)v − β
∗
1 (v)
(n − m)v − (n − m − 1)ϕ∗











(n − 1)(v − β
∗
1 (v))(ϕ∗
21 (v) − β
∗
1 (v))
(n − m)v − (n − m − 1)ϕ∗




From our assumption of stochastic dominance between G1 and G2 over
(c,c + γ),w eh a v e d
dvϕ∗
21 (v) < 1, for all solution (ϕ∗
21,β
∗
1) of (A6-3) and (A6-4)
and all v in (c,c + γ) such that ϕ∗
21 (v)=v. From (A6-3) and (A6-4), this
property implies, through a standard proof (see, for example, Lemma 2 in Mil-
grom and Weber 1982, Lemma A7 in Lebrun 1998, or the proof of Lemma A1-1
in Appendix 1 of the present paper), that there exists δ>0 such that either
ϕ∗
21 (v) >v , for all v in (c,c + δ),o rϕ∗
21 (v) <v , for all v in (c,c + δ).S i m -
ilarly, there exists e δ>0 such that either e ϕ
∗
21 (v) >v , for all v in (c,c + δ),o r
e ϕ
∗
21 (v) <v , for all v in (c,c + δ). We can assume that27 δ = e δ.
If ϕ∗
21 (v) >vand e ϕ
∗




21 (v) >v , for all v in (c,c + δ), Lemma A6-1 is proved. Assume that ϕ∗
21 (v) <
v and e ϕ
∗























1,o v e r(c,d],w es e et h a ti fϕ∗
21 (v)=e ϕ
∗
21 (v) then d
dvϕ∗
21 (v) > d
dve ϕ
∗
21 (v),f o r
all v in (c,c + δ). Again through a standard proof, this implies the existence
of 0 <µ<δsuch that either ϕ∗
21 (v) > e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in (c,c + µ),o r
ϕ∗
21 (v) < e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in (c,c + µ), a n dL e m m aA 6 - 1i sp r o v e di nt h i s
case. The proof in the case ϕ∗
21 (v) >vand e ϕ
∗
21 (v) >v , for all v in (c,c + δ),
is similar. ||
P r o o fo fE x t e n s i o no fR e s u l t sI I I : Suppose that there are two diﬀerent
equilibria (β1,...,βn) and
³
e β1,..., e βn
´












,a n dγ>0 be as
in Lemma A6-1. As in the proof of Lemma A6-1, we can assume, without loss








2,o v e r(c,d].D e ﬁne w as follows:







21 (d), the set in the deﬁnition of w is not empty. Moreover,
from Lemma A6-1, we have either ϕ∗
21 (v) < e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in (c,c + γ),o r
43ϕ∗
21 (v) > e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in (c,c + γ).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,w exists and w ≥ c + γ.
Assume that ϕ∗
21 (v) < e ϕ
∗




21 (v), for all v in (c,w). It is a standard result from the theory of incen-
tive compatible mechanisms that the rateo fi n c r e a s eo ft h ei n t e r i me x p e c t e d




















m G2 (e ϕ
∗
21 (w))
(n−m−1) .F r o m
the inequality between ϕ∗
21 and e ϕ
∗
21 over (c,w) and the equality between them
at w, it then follows that β
∗
1 (w) > e β
∗





and Extension of Results III is proved in the case ϕ∗
21 (v) < e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in
(c,c + δ).
Assume now that ϕ∗
21 (v) > e ϕ
∗
21 (v), for all v in (c,c + δ) and thus for all v
in (c,w). By inverting the (strictly increasing) functions ϕ∗




12 (v) < e ϕ
∗





2 and e ϕ
∗





By applying to the functions β
∗
2 and e β
∗
2 t h es a m ea r g u m e n t sw eu s e di nt h e
previous paragraph, we also ﬁnd a contradiction and Extension of Results III is
proved. ||
Footnotes
1: Comments from two referees and an editor are gratefully acknowledged.
The author beneﬁted from the ﬁnancial support of the Social Sciences and Hu-
manities Research Council of Canada. This discussion paper is a revised version
of Cahier 9923 du Département d’économique de l’Université Laval—Cahier de
Recherche 99-13 du GREEN.
2: As Lebrun (2002) shows, the continuity, implied by the uniqueness, can
also be used to disprove existing conjectures.
3: These authors do not oﬀer any justiﬁcation for their use of L’Hospital’s
rule at a point of singularity, where the derivatives may not be deﬁned. See
footnote 9.
4: Our main uniqueness result is particularly appropriate in this case since
our assumption of strict logconcavity of the cumulative distribution function Fm
arising from collusion is equivalent to the strict logconcavity of the “primitive”
cumulative distribution function F.
5: In Appendix 6, we extend this last result.
6:T h a t i s , f o r a l l v in (ci,d i],t h e r ee x i s t sε>0 such that fi (w) >ε ,f o r
all w in (v − ε,v + ε).
7: We could easily extend Theorem 1 to the case where ci is a mass point
of Fi,f o rs o m ei.
8: This value is 0.
9: The proof of uniqueness does not carry over to the atomless case with
nonbinding reserve price since, in this case, ln
Q
i6=j Fi (αi (b)) takes the inﬁnite
value −∞ =l n0at b = c. A priori, the diﬀerence between the two logarithms
ln
Q
i6=j Fi (αi (b)) and ln
Q
i6=j Fi ( e αi (b)) could increase as b tends towards c,
while, at the same time, both logarithms could tend towards −∞.
44A common mistake here is to make b tend towards c in (1) and “apply”
L’Hospital’s rule to “ﬁnd” that (1) and (2’)—the boundary condition at c that
holds true in the atomless case (see C.3 below)—determine the values of the
derivatives d
dbα1 (c),..., d
dbαn (c). In the case of density functions strictly pos-
itive everywhere, by “applying” L’Hospital’s rule again (whether implicitly or
explicitly), as b tends towards c,t o
Fi(αi(b))
Fi(f αi(b)) and by dividing numerator and de-
nominator by d
dbαi (c)= d
dbe αi (c) and fi (c),o n e“ ﬁnds” that the ratio
Fi(αi(b))
Fi(f αi(b))




Fi(f αi(b)) tend towards one and one “rules out” an
increasing diﬀerence ln
Q
i6=j Fi (αi (b)) − ln
Q
i6=j Fi ( e αi (b)). This procedure is
obviously ﬂawed since it uses the derivatives d
dbα1 (c),..., d
dbαn (c) without prov-
ing that they exist. For a published instance of this oversight, see pp 202-203
in Bajari (2001). However, a similar approach can work in some cases such as,
under some assumptions, when there are only two valuation distributions.
10: Here, as in the rest of the paper, uniqueness refers to the uniqueness
of the equilibrium strategies over the domains of valuations where the bidders
submit “serious bids,” that is, bids that win with strictly positive probability.
11: This will be the case of any inverse equilibrium bid function, since, from
C.1 (Section 3), any direct equilibrium bid function is diﬀerentiable when its
value is strictly larger than c. Actually, as shown in Lebrun (1999a and 1997),
any solution of (1) and (3) over an interval (γ,η] has strictly positive derivatives.
For the sake of completeness, we replicate the proof of this property in Appendix
1 (Lemma A1-2). In Section 5 and Appendix 5.1 (Lemma A5.1-4), we extend
this property to the general case with possibly diﬀerent supports.
12: All our existence and uniqueness results actually hold true even when
lower extremities of the valuation intervals are mass points. However, contrary
to the atomless case, the equilibrium may involve a mixed component when the
highest lower extremity c1 >c 2 is a mass point.
13: Obviously, the domain of the system (1) is here {(b,α1,...,αn)|ci,b<α i ≤ d, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
14:I f c2 <c 1 and v = c2, the deﬁnition of v would imply Fj ([cj,c 2]) > 0,
for all j 6=1 , which would contradict Fi ([ci,v]) = 0 or would simply contradict
the assumption that F2 is atomless.
15: At the unique equilibrium, no bidder bids strictly above r.
16:T h e ﬁrst inequality below applies only when k(η) <n .
17: Note that, from our deﬁnitions and assumptions, d(2) >v .
18: For the sake of completeness, we provide the main steps of this proof in
Appendix 3.2.
19: It is the maximum of the support of the distribution of the highest bid.
20: Because the best reply function βk will be strictly increasing between
dk and d(η).
21: Technically, βi is a regular conditional probability distribution or a
stochastic kernel. See Lebrun 1999a and 1997.
22: Lemma A3.1-1 and its proof apply actually apply even if our only
requirement on the valuation distributions is that their supports be compacts.
23: Otherwise, it would be in the best interest of one of them to submit
45slightly larger bids.
24: maxj6=1 (gj,r) ≤ maxj6=1 (cj,r)=m2.
25:H e r e , αj (η0) and αi (η0) are the limits from the left of αj and αi at η0.
That is, for example, αj (η0) = limb→<η0 αj (b).
26:T h e d e r i v a t i v e a t γ0 is a left-hand derivative.
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